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Itranspired Ruben Amorim could survive defeat by Grimsby. He weathered an important European final against a particularly poor Spurs sides for many years. He could survive home defeats to West Ham and Wolves, finishing 15th, the tactical inflexibility, squandering some of the club’s best homegrown talent, the 32% win rate, labeling his team the poorest in Manchester United history. Yet, there existed a single opponent with whom Ruben Amorim would not be allowed to dance. If you challenge the sporting director, you had better succeed.

Regrettably, like many a Premiership defender during Blackburn Rovers' title-winning 1994-95 season, the coach came at Jason Wilcox and appears to have missed. The most casual observer can see the paradoxical situation: a coach who frequently berated at his players for failing in individual battles succumbing in the face of the intense pressure and formidable presence of one of the Premier League’s most feared football executives.

And frankly, this entire bruising episode seems to paint the director in a whole new light. It may have been tempting, based on his nine months in a similar role at Southampton, to view Jason Wilcox as little more than a functionary within the club's structure: a man whose appointment was due largely to his friendship with ex-colleague Omar Berrada rather than any demonstrable skill. How wrong everyone was. In brilliantly outmanoeuvring United’s feted manager, as he outmanoeuvred the unfortunate a previous executive before him, he has proved himself as one of football's strategic masterminds: a tactical intellect of which the club's mid-table rivals will now be justifiably concerned.

A Tactical Clash Over System & Ideology

For example, this was Jason Wilcox , after being involved in the leadership that hired the 3-4-3 fundamentalist Amorim originally, played a key role in attempting to convince him to ditch his favored formation. Unsurprisingly, these entreaties met a certain resistance. However, such directives hold greater authority when issued by a man of a man the impeccable soccer background he possesses, holder of three England caps and a contributor to a championship team decades past.

Maybe eventually Jason Wilcox may be persuaded to explain his reasoning to the rest of us. Perhaps at some point questions may arise why Amorim is walking away with full compensation, with no penalty clause in place. But Jason Wilcox speaks rarely publicly, for excellent reasons. The real thinkers of this sport – men like Jason Wilcox – function at a level beyond our own mundane comprehension. If he ever did speak, probably all we would hear is a series of high-frequency signals and four-dimensional whirring. Desiring an explanation is not quite the same as being prepared to comprehend it.

An Ultimate Authority Behind Command

Naturally, by focusing our attention on the sporting director we overlook the true genius behind the club's current leadership. The director is, after all, merely executing the commands of his ultimate superior Sir Jim Ratcliffe, who in private has made very clear his desire for a four-man defense. It is reported, the owner has also proposed playing Bryan Mbeumo in a wing-back role. Ratcliffe is keen for United to embrace data science and metrics. According to ESPN, in an executive meeting soon after his minority ownership, he declared that United’s style to football “will be decided in this room”.

After all, Sir Jim is an expert in these intricate footballing stuff, leveraging his background in petrochemicals and yachting. Most importantly he remains incredibly rich, and it is known, the rich are superior: more perceptive, more wise, more tactically astute, fundamentally superior. Whom else would you trust to manage a strategic plan of austerity, the construction of a new stadium that appears similar to someone’s leftover knitting, the acquisition of a new striker?

A New Football Hierarchy: Executives Over Managers

This represents a shift that is becoming prevalent in top-tier of the game. Historically, clubs foolishly delegated major sporting choices to low-level employees such as coaches, scouts – players themselves. Perhaps it was once feasible for a young, innovative manager with ideas and energy to join a club and implement their plan supported to fruition. Yet how many businesses have such individuals established? How many large-scale layoffs have they overseen? Better by far to invest the real power where it belongs: the leadership tier, the open-necked shirt brigade, the guys with the jaw-dropping professional resumes. It is wiser to decide the tactics in the boardroom and appoint a coach who can tailor their methods accordingly. If coaches were formerly chefs, they are now more akin to delivery personnel: not really creating the food, but still finally accountable if it arrives poorly or fails of the box.

Nowadays, their job is increasingly not about crafting the philosophy and more about selling it: the receptionist on the front desk, the visible figurehead for a club they can do little to change. Enzo Maresca leads a team of very young players into the Champions League and wins two medium-sized trophies, and effectively is dismissed for speaking out. A manager at Celtic finds his reputation ruined whereas the people who hired him continue to make errors another day.

The Neoliberal Football: Responsibility Only for the Few

And possibly on some microcosmic level this is simply neoliberalism in action: the elevation of a privileged elite who are infallible, whose choices remain sacrosanct, whose errors can invariably be sacked away without justification. Hire the 3-4-3 coach and then dismiss him for playing excessively that system. Bring in the project manager and later bin them for taking too long. And most importantly be grateful; for your modest season ticket price rises, for your new player acquisitions, for the reality that the adults – however well qualified – remain in control.